An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions by Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Cubel, Maria
  
 
 
SCOTTISH INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIRE DISCUSSION PAPER 
SIRE-DP-2015-49 
  
 
An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions 
 
María Cubel 
Santiago Sanchez-Pages 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 
 
 
 
 
 
www.sire.ac.uk 
 
An axiomatization of di¤erence-form contest
success functions
María Cubely Santiago Sanchez-Pagesz
May 3, 2015
Abstract
This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of di¤erence-
form group contests, that is, contests fought among groups and where
their probability of victory depends on the di¤erence of their e¤ec-
tive e¤orts. This axiomatization rests on the property of Equalizing
Consistency, stating that the di¤erence between winning probabili-
ties in the grand contest and in the smaller contest should be identical
across all participants in the smaller contest. This property overcomes
some of the drawbacks of the widely-used ratio-form contest success
functions. Our characterization shows that the criticisms commonly-
held against di¤erence-form contests success functions, such as lack of
scale invariance and zero elasticity of augmentation, are unfounded.
By clarifying the properties of this family of contest success functions,
this axiomatization can help researchers to nd the functional form
better suited to their application of interest.
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1 Introduction
Despite the relevance and ubiquity of contests in the real world, contest the-
ory is often criticized for its great reliance on a particular construct: The
Contest Success Function (Hirshleifer, 1989). This function maps the e¤orts
made by contenders into their probability of attaining victory or, alterna-
tively, their share of the contested prize. Critics argue that the CSF is too
reduced form, too much of a black-box. For instance, the widely-used Tullock
CSF (Tullock, 1967; 1980) under which success in the contest depends on rel-
ative e¤orts might seem sensible. But there is no apparent reason why this
functional form should govern most types of contests, from interstate wars to
sport competitions.1 Because of this, the predictions of contest theory might
be seen as too reliant on very specic functional forms rather than on sound
economic principles.
This view is somewhat unfair for two reasons: Firstly, because there
are other areas of Economics where very specic functional forms are often
assumed. Secondly, because there is an active and fruitful strand of the
literature which in the last few years has provided a variety of foundations
to the most frequently employed CSFs.2 This literature has even addressed
the econometric estimation of these functions.3 As a result of these e¤orts,
economists have now at their disposal a growing menu of well-founded CSFs
to choose from. The next natural question is which type of CSF is better
suited to each specic application. A systematic study of the properties of
each family of CSFs can contribute to that aim.
One family of contests assumes that winning probabilities depend on the
di¤erence of contenderse¤orts. These di¤erence-form contests were intro-
duced by Hirshleifer (1989; 1991) and explored later by Baik (1998) and
Che and Gale (2000) for the case of bilateral contests. Di¤erence-form CSFs
have been shown to emerge naturally in a number of settings. Gersbach and
Haller (2009) show that a linear di¤erence-form CSF is the result of intra-
household bargaining when partners must decide how much time to devote
to themselves or to their partner. Corchón and Dahm (2010) microfound a
di¤erence-form CSF as the result of a game where contenders are uncertain
about the type of the external decider; by interpreting the CSF as a share,
they also show that the di¤erence-form coincides with the claim-egalitarian
bargaining solution. Corchón and Dahm (2011) obtain the di¤erence-form
1For excellent surveys of the contest literature see Corchon (2007) and Konrad (2009).
2These characterizations fall into four main categories: Axiomatic, stochastic,
optimally-designed and microfounded (Jia, Skaperdas and Vaidya, 2013).
3For a detailed discussion of the econometric issues involved in the estimation of CSFs
see Jia and Skaperdas (2011) and Jia et al. (2013).
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as the result of a problem where the contest designer is unable to commit to
a specic CSF once contenders have already exerted their e¤orts. Skaperdas
and Vaydia (2012) show that the di¤erence-form CSF can be derived in a
Bayesian framework in which contenders produce evidence stochastically in
order to persuade an audience of the correctness of their respective views.
Finally, Polishchuk and Tonis (2013) show that a logarithmic di¤erence-form
CSF results from using a mechanism design approach when contestants have
private information over their valuation of victory. In summary, it is fair to
conclude that di¤erence-form CSFs are by now well micro-founded. How-
ever, little is known about their actual properties and about how these di¤er
from the properties of the more often used ratio-form CSFs, where winning
probabilities are a function of the ratio of contenderse¤ective e¤orts.
The present paper o¤ers the rst axiomatic characterization of the family
of di¤erence-form CSFs. This axiomatization rests on the Equalizing Con-
sistency property which imposes the following condition. Consider a smaller
contest among a subset of participants in the grand contest. Equalizing
Consistency imposes that the di¤erence between winning probabilities in the
grand contest and in the smaller contest should be identical across all partic-
ipants in the smaller contest. Under this axiom then, disparities in winning
probabilities across participants in a subcontest are smaller than in the grand
contest. The Equalizing Consistency axiom di¤ers from the consistency ax-
iom employed in all the existing characterizations of the ratio-form CSF.
That axiom, which we relabel as Proportional Consistency here, is typically
understood as imposing that contestantswinning probabilities in a smaller
contest should be proportional to their winning probability in the big contest.
We employ here an equivalent interpretation of the axiom, which is that the
di¤erence between winning probabilities in the grand contest and in a smaller
contest must be proportional to contestantschances of success in the grand
contest. Therefore, under Proportional Consistency, disparities in winning
probabilities across participants in a smaller contest widen up compared to
their winning probabilities in the grand contest.
We show that the Equalizing Consistency axiom can overcome some of
the problems presented by the family of ratio-form CSFs. Our Theorem 1
shows that Equalizing Consistency, together with a number of reasonable
axioms already employed in the literature, characterize a generalized version
of the linear di¤erence-form CSF introduced by Che and Gale (2000). This
family of CSFs also encompass as particular cases the ones micro-founded
in the aforementioned literature as well as the ones employed by Levine and
Smith (1995), Rohner (2006), Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) and Gartzke
and Rohner (2011).
With our axiomatization, we help to clarify the properties that charac-
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terize the families of CSFs studied in the literature. Contrary to the received
wisdom, we show that the di¤erence-form CSF can be scale invariant, i.e.
homogeneous of degree zero (Theorem 2), and that it can have a positive
elasticity of augmentation (Theorem 3).4 These misconceptions are due to
the common assumption of linear impacts, which we dispense with, and to
the common usage of the term "di¤erence-form CSF" to refer to the logistic
functional form introduced by Hirshleifer (1989; 1991), under which winning
probabilities are proportional to contendersexponential e¤orts.
This paper contributes to the axiomatic work pioneered by Skaperdas
(1996) and Clark and Riis (1998). Later, Münster (2009) extended this
characterization from individual to group contests. Arbatskaya and Mi-
alon (2009) and Rai and Sarin (2009) axiomatized multi-investment contests,
whilst Blavatskyy (2010) did the same for contests with ties. More recently,
Hwang (2012) axiomatized the family of CSF with constant elasticity of aug-
mentation, which encompasses the logistic and the ratio forms as particular
cases. Vesperoni (2013) and Lu and Wang (2014) axiomatized contests pro-
ducing a ranking of players instead of a sole winner. Lu and Wang (2014)
characterized success functions for contests with strict rankings of players,
whereas Vesperoni (2013) axiomatized an alternative success function for
rankings of any type. Finally, Bozbay and Vesperoni (2014) characterized a
CSF for conicts embedded in network architectures. Let us add that in our
axiomatization we make connections with the income inequality literature,
and in particular with the concept of absolute inequality introduced by Kolm
(1976a,b). The literature on inequality measurement o¤ers valuable insights
on the properties of functional forms which we explicitly employ at several
points of the text.5
2 Axiomatization
In order to be as general as possible, we consider a society divided in K  2
disjoint groups formed by a number nk  1 of individuals each adding up
to a total of N .6 Denote the set of groups by K: These K groups are in
4Elasticity of augmentation was introduced by Hwang (2012). A positive elasticity
implies that the di¤erence between the winning probabilities of two contenders diminishes
when their e¤orts increase whilst keeping constant the di¤erence between them.
5In this same spirit, Chakravarty and Maharaj (2014) have recently characterized a
new family of individual contests success functions which satisfy properties akin to the in-
termediate inequality and ordinal consistency axioms employed in the income distribution
literature.
6Individual contests are a particular case of the ones studied here. All our results,
except those in Section 4, which deal with the aggregation of individual e¤orts within
4
competition. They are engaged in a contest which can have only one winner.
Members of the contender groups can expend non-negative e¤ort in order
to help their group to win the contest. Depending on the specic type of
contest, these e¤orts can be money, time, physical e¤ort or weapons. Denote
by xk  (x1k; :::; xnkk) 2 Rnk+ the vector of non-negative e¤orts by members
of group k and by x the vector (x1; :::;xK). For convenience we will denote
by x k the vector of e¤orts in groups other than k:
E¤orts determine the winning probability of each group according to a
Contest Success Function (CSF) pk : RN+! R+: The function pk(x) can also
be thought of as the share of the prize or object being contested that group
k obtains in case of victory. We favor the former interpretation throughout
the paper.
Let us now state the axioms that we would like to impose on our CSF.
2.1 Two basic axioms: Let us rst present two axioms introduced by
Skaperdas (1996) in his axiomatization of CSFs for individual contests and
later generalized by Münster (2009) for group contests. These axioms are
rather natural and should thus apply to the class of di¤erence-form group
contests we study in this paper.
Axiom 1 (Probability)
PK
k=1 pk(x) = 1 and pk(x)  0 for any x and all
k 2 K:
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity) Consider two generic vectors xk and x0k such
that x0k > xk. Then,
(i) pk(x
0
k;x k) pk(xk;x k); with strict inequality if pk(xk;x k) 2 (0; 1):
(ii) pl(x
0
k;x k) pl(xk;x k) for all l 6= k and l 2 K:
The axiom of Probability just states that the CSF generates a proba-
bility distribution over the set of groups. The Monotonicity axiom implies
that group winning probabilities are weakly increasing in the e¤ort of mem-
bers and weakly decreasing in the e¤ort of outsiders. Note that this axiom is
slightly weaker than the Monotonicity axiom employed in Münster (2009) and
the analogous one in Rai and Sarin (2009).
2.2 Subcontest axioms: The next two axioms relate to contests played
among a generic non-empty subset S  K of contender groups. We refer
to this contest among groups in S as a subcontest. Let us denote by S the
groups, thus apply to individual contests as well.
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cardinality of subcontest S and by pSk(x) the winning probability of group k
in this subcontest. In particular, denote by pfk;lgk (x) the winning probability
of group k in the bilateral contest against group l: Finally, denote by xS and
x S the vector of e¤orts in the groups inside and outside S respectively.
Axiom 3 (Independence) pSk(x) does not depend on x S; or p
S
k(x) can be
written as pSk(xS):
Independence implies that the e¤orts made by contenders outside a sub-
contest should not matter to its result. As discussed by Skaperdas (1996)
and Clark and Riis (1998), this property relates to the axiom of Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Alternatives in probabilistic individual choice. Thus, it is
a reasonable property in contests where nature determines the winner. Inde-
pendence also implies that there are no spillovers across subcontests or that
spillovers a¤ect all contenders in S equally.7
The next axiom is crucial in our axiomatization of the family of di¤erence-
form CSFs.
Axiom 4 (Equalizing Consistency) For any vector x and any subcontest
S  K such that pk(x) > 0 for all k 2 S
pSk(x) =pk(x) +
1
S
(1 
X
l2S
pl(x)): (1)
Given any subcontest formed by groups with a positive probability of
winning the grand contest, Equalizing Consistency states that the probability
of group k winning that subcontest is equal to its probability of winning the
grand contest plus a xed amount. That amount is an equal proportion of the
probability that no group in the subcontest wins the grand contest. In other
words, suppose that a number of contenders drop out from K and that all
remaining contenders had a positive probability of winning the grand contest.
The axiom states that the remaining groups "share" equally the probability
of any of the non participating groups winning the grand contest.
It is natural to expect that the winning probability of contenders should
be higher when competing in S than when competing in K. Equalizing Con-
sistency implies that this increase should be the same across contenders.
This, of course, does not exhaust all possibilities. Interestingly, it is pos-
sible to state the main axiom characterizing the family of ratio-form CSFs
in a similar way. This axiom is called simply Consistency by Skaperdas
7We thank Luis Corchon for pointing this out.
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(1996), Münster (2009) and Ray and Sarin (2009). We here rename it as Pro-
portional Consistency in order to avoid confusion with the previous axiom.
Axiom 4(Proportional Consistency) For any vector x and any group
k 2 S  K
pSk(x) =
pk(x)X
l2S
pl(x)
= pk(x) +
pk(x)X
l2S
pl(x)
(1 
X
l2S
pl(x)): (2)
This axiom posits that the increase in winning probabilities that members
of the subcontest experience from narrowing the contest from K to S must
be proportional to their winning probability in the grand contest.
Let us now devote some time to compare the implications of these two
axioms. Proportional Consistency is often invoked as a natural assumption.
It implies that the relative success of two groups should be identical across
subcontests, that is
pSk(x)
pSl (x)
=
pk(x)
pl(x)
:
However, this property presents some drawbacks. First, it is not well
dened when pk(x) = 0 for all contenders in S. Second, it forces contenders
with zero probability in the grand contest to have a zero winning probability
in any subconstest. For instance, suppose that a contender k is very weak
and has a zero winning probability in the big contest, whereas group l is
marginally stronger and has a winning probability " arbitrarily close to zero.
Then group k must have a zero winning probability in any subcontest S,
including the bilateral contest against the similarly weak group l. This might
be undesirable in some contexts, as in Political Economy applications, where
a party may have no chances in a general election but a large probability of
winning a local one.
On the other hand, the Equalizing Consistency axiom implies that the
di¤erence in winning probabilities between two groups should be identical
across subcontests whose groups have positive winning probabilities in the
grand contest, that is
pSk(x) pSl (x)=pk(x) pl(x):
Therefore, Equalizing Consistency does not impose anything on con-
tenders with a zero winning probability in K. Still, we can compare both
axioms when a contender has a winning probability arbitrarily close to zero.
Take two contenders, one with winning probability p < 1 and a weaker one
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with winning probability " < p. Under Proportional Consistency, the latter
would win their bilateral contest with probability "
"+p
; which tends to zero as
" goes to zero. Under Equalizing Consistency though, the weaker contender
would win instead with probability 1
2
  p "
2
which tends to 1 p
2
> 0 as " goes
to zero.
The reader may argue that one drawback of the Equalizing Consistency
axiom could be the following: Consider a scenario where one contender group
is much weaker than the rest of groups, who are all equally strong. But
because there is a large number of these strong groups, each of them enjoys
a winning probability of just q" where q > 1 and " is the winning probability
of the weak group. Equalizing Consistency would imply that the weak group
would have a winning probability of 1
2
  (q 1)"
2
in a bilateral contest against one
of the strong groups. This seems unrealistic since this group is substantially
weaker than the other. But as we will see below, the CSF that we axiomatize
here would bound to zero the winning probability of the weak contender; if
this group had a positive winning probability in the grand contest then it
could not be much weaker than the rest.
One last word on the comparison of these two axioms. Equalizing and
Proportional Consistency are approximately equivalent when the members of
the subcontest have similar winning probabilities in the grand contest, so that
pk(x)X
l2S
pl(x)
 1
S
:
2.3 The main theorem: We are now in the position to state our main
theorem characterizing the family of the di¤erence-form CSFs. This family
emerges from using the basic axioms of Probability, Monotonicity and Inde-
pendence together with Equalizing Consistency.
Theorem 1 If the CSF pk(x) is continuous and satises axioms A1-A4 then
for each vector x there exists an integer K  K such that
pk(x) =
8><>:
1
K + hk(xk)  1K
KX
l=1
hl(xl) for k = 1; :::; K
0 otherwise
(3)
where without loss of generality hk+1(xk+1)  hk(xk) and where each hk :
Rnk+ ! R is a continuous and increasing function.
Proof. Take any three contender groups j; k and l with strictly positive
winning probabilities in K: Then,
pk(x) pl(x) = pk(x) pj(x) + pj(x) pl(x)
= p
fk;jg
k (xk;xj) pfk;jgj (xk;xj)+pfl;jgj (xl;xj) pfl;jgl (xl;xj);
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where the second equality comes from A3 and from the fact that A4 also
applies to the bilateral contests involving the pairs of contenders fk; jg and
fl; jg: By the same token, it must be that pk(x) pl(x) = pfk;lgk (xk;xl) pfk;lgl (xk;xl)
so it is possible to rewrite the above expression as
p
fk;lg
k (xk; xl)  pfk;lgl (xk; xl) = pfk;jgk (xk; xj)  pfk;jgj (xk; xj)
 (pfl;jgl (xl; xj)  pfl;jgj (xl; xj));
which by A1 boils down to
p
fk;lg
k (xk;xl) pfk;lgl (xk;xl) =2(pfk;jgk (xk;xj) pfl;jgl (xl;xj)):
Since the left hand side of the expression does not depend on xj; the right
hand side cannot depend on xj either. Therefore, we can rewrite the right
hand side as the di¤erence of two functions
p
fk;lg
k (xk;xl) pfk;lgl (xk;xl) =hk(xk) hl(xl):
And by using A4 again we obtain
pk(x) pl(x) =hk(xk) hl(xl): (4)
Note that hk : Rnk+ ! R must be continuous given that pk(x) and pl(x)
are continuous too. Denote by K the set of contender groups who enjoy a
positive winning probability in the grand contest, that is, those A4 apply to.
Let K be the cardinality of this set. Adding up expression (4) across these
K groups we obtain
Kpk(x) 1=Khk(xk) 
X
l2K
hl(xl); (5)
which after noting that
X
l2K
pl(x) = 1 leads to expression (3).
We next characterize the set K: We have established that pk can be
written as a mapping from impacts into probabilities, i.e. pk : RK+ ! [0; 1].
We can then associate a function hk : Rnk+ ! R to each group: Given x and
without loss of generality, let us order groups in a decreasing manner such
that hk(xk)  hk+1(xk+1): We shall now argue that the set K is given by
the largest integer K such that
1
K
+ hK(xK)  1
K
KX
l=1
hl(xl) > 0: (6)
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Because we ordered groups in a decreasing manner, (6) holds true for any
group k = 1; :::; K: Observe that such K is unique and well-dened since
it is straightforward to show that
1
K
+hK(xK)  1
K
KX
l=1
hl(xl) >
1
K + 1
+hK+1(xK+1)  1
K + 1
K+1X
l=1
hl(xl):
By construction, (6) must hold for any contender group with pk(x) >0:
We must then work out the opposite implication, that is, that if (6) holds
for group k then pk(x) >0: Suppose on the contrary that pk(x) =0: Adding
up (3) across all groups l from 1 to K except k yields
1 =
K   1
K
+
KX
l=1;l 6=k
hl(xl)  K
   1
K
KX
l=1
hl(xl)
=
K   1
K
  hk(xk) + 1
K
KX
l=1
hl(xl);
implying that
1
K
+ hk(xk)  1
K
KX
l=1
hl(xl) = 0;
thus contradicting that (6) holds for k:
We must nally prove that each function hk(xk) is increasing. Consider
a pair of vectors x0 and x such that x0 = (x1; :::;x0k; :::;xK) where x
0
k > xk.
That is, vector x0 is identical to vector x except for group k: By A2 it must
be that pk(x)  pk(x0) and pl(x)  pl(x0) for any l 6= k: The property holds
trivially if pk(x) = 0 or pl(x) = 0: If both probabilities are strictly positive,
expression (4) implies that
hk(xk) hl(xl) = pk(x) pl(x)
 pk(x0)  pl(x0) = hk(x0k) hl(xl);
thus proving that hk(xk) is increasing. This nalizes the proof.
The function hk(xk) is commonly known as the impact function. It aggre-
gates memberse¤orts into a measure of their group inuence in the contest.
Alternatively, it can be seen as the function determining how e¤ective players
e¤orts are.
The di¤erence-form group CSF in (3) relates the success of a group to
the di¤erence between its impact and the average impact of all the groups
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involved in the contest. If the impact of a group is above (below) the average
impact, its winning probability must be above (below) the winning probabil-
ity that the group would be awarded under a fair lottery. If the impact of a
group is positive but su¢ ciently below average impact, its winning probabil-
ity is just zero. Of course, this should never happen in equilibrium if e¤orts
are costly.
One immediately obvious feature of this CSF is that it is additively sep-
arable in the impact of the contestant groups. The marginal productivity of
individual e¤orts does not depend on the e¤orts of outsiders. This implies
that any equilibrium in an individual contest under this CSF must be in
dominant strategies.
The di¤erence-form CSF also allows contenders to attain a sure victory
if their impact is su¢ ciently large. Take for instance, the case of two-group
contests, i.e. K = 2; where (3) boils down to
pk(x) =min

max

1
2
+

2
[hk(xk)  hj(xj)]; 0

; 1

:
This CSF generalizes the linear di¤erence-form CSF for two-player con-
tests introduced by Che and Gale (2000) and later employed by Rohner
(2006), Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) and Gartzke and Rohner (2011).
Contender k can obtain victory with certainty if hk(xk)  1 + hj(xj): This
shows that, as highlighted by Che and Gale (2000), the di¤erence-form CSF
has strong connections with auctions. Albeit noisy, this CSF allows con-
tenders to obtain a sure win by outbidding others by a wide enough margin.
On the other hand, a contender with zero impact can still enjoy a positive
winning probability if the other contestants have not too large impacts. That
would be the case for k in the example above if hj(xj) < 1 : As argued by
Hirshleifer (1991) this ts well with confrontations with severe frictions such
as incomplete information, fatigue or di¢ cult terrain where contenders nd
extremely costly to overpower rivals.
An nal remark is in order here: Our Theorem 1 di¤ers from Theorem 1
in Münster (2009) in that we replace Proportional Consistency by Equalizing
Consistency. This new axiom leads to the characterization of the family of
di¤erence-form CSFs. Recall that Proportional and Equalizing Consistency
di¤er on how contenderswinning probability in a subcontest relate to their
winning probability in the grand contest. In particular, they di¤er on how to
distribute -proportionally or equally- the "excess" probability 1  
X
l2S
pl(x)
across members of the subcontest. This can explain why Corchon and Dahm
(2010) nd that the di¤erence-form CSF generates a sharing rule which co-
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incides with the claim-egalitarian bargaining solution whereas the ratio-form
CSF coincides with the claim-proportional bargaining solution.
3 Invariance
3.1 Scale invariance
In this section, we study two other properties employed in previous axiomatic
characterizations of CSFs. These properties impose the invariance of winning
probabilities to certain changes in the prole of contestantse¤orts. The rst
one, and most-commonly used, is homogeneity of degree zero, which we refer
to here as scale invariance.
Axiom 5 (Scale Invariance) For all  > 0 and all k 2 K
pk(x) =pk(x):
This axiom states that winning probabilities must remain constant to
equiproportional changes in all contenderse¤orts. Scale invariance implies
that units of measurement of e¤ort do not matter. This is a desirable prop-
erty when e¤orts are measured in money or military units (battalions, regi-
ments, etc.). It is a property which is also satised by the indices of relative
inequality introduced by Atkinson (1970).
Münster (2009) proved that if a CSF satises axioms A1-A3, A4and A6,
then the impact functions in the ratio-form CSF must be all homogeneous of
the same degree. Let us now do the analogous axiomatization exercise in our
setting and characterize the family of scale invariant di¤erence-form CSFs.
Theorem 2 If a CSF satises axioms A1-A5, then it satises (3) and the
impact functions hk(xk) are homothetic functions satisfying
hk(xk) = k +  ln g(xk), (7)
where k and  > 0 are parameters and the function g(xk) : Rnk+ ! R+ is
increasing, homogeneous of degree one and satises g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
Proof. A5 implies that pk(x) =pk(x): Hence, if pk(x) =0 then pk(x) =0
and viceversa, so the set K does not change: Again, we denote its cardinality
simply by K:
In the next step of the proof we follow a similar procedure as in the proof
of Theorem 2 in Rai and Sarin (2009, p. 147). Take any two di¤erent groups
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k; j  K. By Theorem 1, pk(x) =pk(x) implies that their impact functions
satisfy
hk(xk)  hk(xk) = hj(xj)  hj(xj) = 1
K
[
X
l2K
hl(xl) 
X
l2K
hl(xl)];
for any xk 2 Rnk+ nf0g: Since the last term in the above equality is just a
constant, the di¤erence hk(xk)  hk(xk) is the same for all k  K and we
can conclude that this di¤erence depends on  but not on xk: Hence it must
hold true that
hk(xk)  hk(xk) = hk(  1)  hk(1);
where 1 =(1; :::; 1) is the vector of appropriate length whose components are
all equal to one.
Now add and substract hk(1) to the left hand side of this expression and
denote H(xk) = hk(xk)  hk(1): It can then be rewritten as
H(xk) = H(1) +H(xk):
If xk = t  1 for t > 0 then
H(t1) = H(1) +H(t1):
Dene now G() = H(1): This is a function of just one variable and it is
increasing and continuous since by Theorem 1 we know already that hk(xk)
must be increasing and continuous. We can then rewrite
G(t) = G() +G(t):
This is one of the Cauchy functional equations whose only solution is
given by G(z) =  ln z where  is an arbitrary constant (Aczél, 1966, p. 41).
This implies
H(1) = G() = ln;
and by the same token that
H(xk) = ln
 +H(xk):
Given our denition of the function H(); this implies that
hk(xk) = ln
 + hk(xk):
By A5, it must be that  is identical for all impact functions.
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Now, consider the case xk = 0: Fix xj 6= 0 for each j 6= k in K and
 6= 1. Because pk(x) =pk(x) it must be that
1
K
+
K   1
K
hk(0)  1
K
X
lK;l 6=k
(ln + hl(xl))
=
1
K
+
K   1
K
hk(0)  1
K
X
lK;l 6=k
hl(xl):
This identity can only hold under two circumstances: First, if  = 0;
which in turn implies that the impact functions must be homogeneous of
degree zero, i.e. hk(xk) = hk(xk). But for any  6= 1 this violates A2 since
it imposes that the impact functions must be strictly increasing in their
arguments when a winning probability is in the interval (0; 1). So we are left
with the only other possible case, that is, limxk!0+ hk(xk) =  1:
Next dene Fk(xk) = expfhk(xk)g: It is clear that the function Fk(xk)
is homogeneous of degree  since Fk(xk) = 
Fk(xk): This is a function
of one variable, which in turn must be a multiple of a power function, i.e.
F (s) = as with  > 0 and a = F (1) (Münster, 2009; p 352): Hence it is
possible to rewrite
Fk(xk) = ak(gk(xk))
;
where gk : Rnk+ ! R: The function gk(xk) must be homogeneous of degree one
since
Fk(xk) = 
Fk(xk)) gk(xk) = g(xk):
Finally, tracing back our steps
hk(xk) = lnFk(xk) = ln ak +  ln g(xk) = k +  ln g(xk):
Given that limxk!0+ hk(xk) =  1 it must be that g(0) = 0: Finally,
observe that it must also be that gk(1) = 1 given that
ak = Fk(1) = expfhk(1)g = ak(gk(1)):
The di¤erence-form CSF has been often criticized because it seemed to
necessarily violate scale-invariance (Skaperdas, 1996; Hirshleifer, 2000; Al-
calde and Dahm, 2007, p. 103; Corchón, 2007, p. 74). Our Theorem 2
proves that such criticism is ungrounded. If the impact function is of the
form (7), winning probabilities under the family of di¤erence-form CSFs in
(3) are invariant to equiproportional changes in contenderse¤orts. Changes
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in the unit of measurement of e¤orts do not generate changes in contenders
winning probabilities (albeit their impact do change).
To the best of our knowledge, this family of scale invariant di¤erence-form
CSFs has only been studied in Polishchuk and Tonis (2013, p. 218). They
microfound a CSF of the form
pk(x) =
1
K
+ ln g(xk)  1
K
KX
l=1
ln g(xl);
by using a mechanism design approach when contenders are individuals who
have private information over their valuation of victory. For the case of group
contests, one example of a function satisfying (7) is the function hk(xk) =
k +  ln(
1
nk
Pnk
i=1 xik); which we study in more detail in Section 4.
3.2 Translation invariance
If a CSF is dened as a function of the di¤erence between contenderse¤orts,
another natural invariance property is the following: Winning probabilities
should remain constant when the e¤ort of all contenders increase by the same
amount. This is equivalent to the following property.
Axiom 6 (Translation Invariance) For all  > 0 and all k 2 K;
pk(x+1) =pk(x):
Skaperdas (1996) and Münster (2009) used this property as an alterna-
tive to homogeneity of degree zero in their axiomatization of the ratio-form
CSFs. Actually, Translation Invariance can be traced back to the income
distribution literature, and in particular to the concept of absolute inequal-
ity introduced by Kolm (1976a,b). Absolute inequality states that the level
of inequality in a distribution should not vary when the income of every indi-
vidual increases by the same xed amount. Hence, any measure of absolute
income inequality must be translation invariant.
However, the standard Translation Invariance axiom builds in an implicit
bias against big groups. Adding a constant  to the e¤ort of each member
means that total group e¤ort increases by nk: Therefore, bigger groups
increase their e¤ort more than smaller groups in absolute terms. But the
standard Translation Invariance property implies that winning probabilities
should remain invariant after that change. In order to correct this bias, we
introduce the following axiom:
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Axiom 7 (Group Translation Invariance) For all  > 0 and all k 2 K
pk(x1+

n1
1; ::;xK+ 
nK
1) =pk(x):
This property implies that if the total e¤ort increases across all groups
by the same positive amount  by members increasing their e¤ort by a x
amount 
nk
, winning probabilities should remain constant. Group Translation
Invariance thus levels the playeld: It eliminates the bias against big groups
implicitly built in the standard Translation Invariance property, a bias which
has been so far overlooked by the literature.8
Before stating our next theorem, consider the following denition:
Denition The impact function hk(xk) is said to be translatable if
hk(xk+1) =hk(xk)+k where k;  > 0:
We will refer to the scalar k as the degree of (linear) translatability
of the impact function. Translatability is analogous to linear homogeneity
when a xed amount is added to the arguments of a function. We borrow
this concept from the income distribution literature; it is a building block
in the analysis of absolute inequality (Kolm, 1976a, 1976b; Blackorby and
Donaldson, 1980).
We are nally ready to state our theorem characterizing the family of
translation invariant di¤erence-formCSFs.
Theorem 3 If a CSF satises axioms A1-A4 and A6, then it satises (3)
and the impact functions hk(xk) are translatable of the same degree  > 0.
If A6 is replaced by A7, then each impact function hk(xk) is translatable of
degree nk.
Proof. A6 implies that pk(x+1) =pk(x) so we can use the same reasoning
as in the proof of Theorem 2 to establish that K does not change.
Now, combining Theorem 1 with the Translation Invariance axiom for
any k; l  K we obtain,
hk(xk+1) hk(xk) =hl(xl + 1) hl(xl):
Since this holds for any l; k  K, the di¤erence in impacts must depend
only on  so
hk(xk+1) hk(xk) =();
8This bias against big groups is not built in the Scale Invariance property: When each
members e¤ort increases in the same proportion, the total e¤ort of all groups increases in
that same proportion.
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where () is a continuous function because it is equal to the di¤erence of
two continuous functions. This expression holds for any  > 0 so
hk(xk+(+ )1)=hk(xk + 1)+() =hk(xk)+()+();
implying that
(+) =()+():
This is just the Cauchy functional equation whose only solution is of the
form () =  where  > 0 is an arbitrary real number:
The proof when A6 is replaced by A7 runs along the same lines. It must
be that
hk(xk+

nk
 1) hk(xk) = k(

nk
);
where  k() is also continuous because it is the di¤erence of two continuous
functions. Note that for this expression to hold true, it must be also that
 k(

nk
) = l(

nl
): (8)
Because this holds for any  > 0 then one can write
hk(xk+
+ 
nk
1)=hk(xk +

nk
1)+ k(

nk
) =hk(xk)+ k(

nk
)+ k(

nk
);
which implies that
 k(
+ 
nk
) = k(

nk
)+ k(

nk
):
By induction, it is easy to see that this property implies that  k() =
nk k(

nk
): Hence,  k( + ) = k()+ k(): This is again the Cauchy func-
tional equation whose solution is  k() = k: This together with (8) implies
that
 k(

nk
) =
 k()
nk
=
k
nk
=
l
nl
=
 l()
nl
=  l(

nl
);
so k = nk where  is an arbitrary positive scalar. This completes the
proof.
For an example of a translation invariant di¤erence-form CSF, consider
the following impact function which we employ in a companion paper (Cubel
and Sanchez-Pages, 2014):
hk(xk) =n

k ln (
1
nk
nkX
i=1
e xik) 
1
 where k  0 and  2 f0; 1g:
17
This is the natural logarithm of a CES function with exponential e¤orts.
The parameter  measures the degree of complementarity of memberse¤orts.
This function is linear when  = 0. It violates Monotonicity when  !1 as
it converges to the weakest-link technology (Hirshleifer, 1983). This function
satises Translation Invariance if  = 0 and Group Translation Invariance if
 = 1:
One remark is in order at this point: In his Theorem 3, Münster (2009)
characterizes the class of ratio-form CSF which are also translation invariant.
He shows that for individual contests, this class boils down to the logistic CSF
introduced by Hirshleifer (1989; 1991). In the literature, the logistic form is
often referred to as a di¤erence-form CSF. At the light of our axiomatization,
we see this label as a misnomer. As our Theorem 1 shows, this form does
not satisfy the Equalizing Consistency axiom. Hence, in order to be precise
and rigorous, we believe that the logistic form should remain classied as a
(translation invariant) element of the family of ratio-form CSFs.
4 Aggregation
So far, none of the properties we have posit on CSFs is specic to group
contests. A distinctive feature of confrontations among groups is that mem-
berse¤orts must be aggregated in some form. This is modelled through the
impact function. Further assumptions on the aggregation of e¤orts are thus
needed in order to obtain sharper characterizations. Consider the following
axiom introduced by Münster (2009).
Axiom 8 (Summation) For any k 2 K consider two e¤ort vectors xk and
x0k such that
Pnk
i=1 xik =
Pnk
i=1 x
0
ik. Then it must be that
pk(xk;x k) =pk(x0k;x k):
This axiom implies that winning probabilities should remain invariant to
changes in the distribution of e¤orts within groups which leave total group
e¤ort unchanged. In the context of lobbying or rent-seeking, where e¤orts
are monetary, such assumption seems granted. Underlying this axiom is the
assumption that e¤orts within groups are perfect substitutes, so the marginal
productivity of individual e¤ort does not depend on the e¤ort made by other
group members.
Let us now apply this property to our characterization of the family of
di¤erence-formCSFs.
Proposition 1 If a CSF satises axioms A1-A5 and A8, then it is of the
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form (3) and the impact functions hk(xk) satisfy
hk(xk) = k +  ln(
1
nk
nkX
i=1
xik), (9)
where k and  > 0 are parameters.
Proof. Given Theorem 2, we only need to prove that g(xk) = 1nk
Pnk
i=1 xik:
By A8, we know that the impact function can be expressed just as a function
of the average e¤ort of the group
hk(xk) = hk(
1
nk
nkX
i=1
xik; :::;
1
nk
nkX
i=1
xik):
This together with expression (7), implies that it is possible to write
g(xk) = (
1
nk
Pnk
i=1 xik): Since by Theorem 2 (
1
nk
Pnk
i=1 xik) must be homo-
geneous of degree one and because it is a function of one variable, it must be
a multiple of a power function. Hence,
(
1
nk
nkX
i=1
xik) = a
1
nk
nkX
i=1
xik;
where by Theorem 2 again, a = (1) = g(1) = 1: This leads to the functional
form (9) : Note that this function g(xk) satises that g(0) = 0.
The addition of Summation to our set of axioms produces a tighter char-
acterization of the impact function. Proposition 1 highlights once more that
the di¤erence-form CSF can be scale invariant when the function mapping
memberse¤orts into group impact is logarithmic. This result can also re-
spond to a criticism often made against this family of CSFs and originally
raised in Hirshleifer (2000)9: If the di¤erence between the e¤orts of two con-
tenders is kept xed, the weaker side should be more likely to win as the
absolute e¤orts of the contenders increase. More formally, pfk:jgk (xk; xk + c)
should be increasing in xk; where c > 0: This property is called positive
elasticity of augmentation by Hwang (2012). It is not satised in two-player
contests by either the logistic ratio-form or the linear CSF introduced by Che
9It might be thought a fatal objection against the di¤erence form of the CSF that a
force balance of 1,000 soldiers versus 999 implies the same outcome (in terms of relative
success) as 3 soldiers versus 2! [...] Any reasonable provision for randomness would imply
a higher likelihood of the weaker side winning the 1,000:999 comparison than in the 3:2
comparison.(Hirshleifer, 2000, p 779)
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and Gale (2000). This is because these CSFs assume a linear mapping from
e¤ort to impact, which renders these functions translation invariant, that is
p
fk:jg
k (xk; xk + c) = p
fk:jg
k (xk + t; xk + t+ c);
for t > 0: This in turn implies that pfk:jgk (xk; xk + c) is constant in c so the
elasticity of augmentation is zero. Such feature seems indeed unreasonable
in many circumstances. It is easy to see that if the di¤erence-form group
CSF satises Scale Invariance and Summation, so the impact functions are
as in (9), then for any  > 1
pfk;jg
k
(
nkX
i=1
xik; c+
nkX
i=1
xik) = p
fk;jg
k
(
nkX
i=1
xik; c+
nkX
i=1
xik)
 pfk;jg
k
(
nkX
i=1
xik; c+
nkX
i=1
xik);
where the last inequality follows from the Monotonicity axiom. Therefore,
the weaker group has a higher winning probability as the total e¤orts of
the two groups increase whilst keeping the di¤erence between total e¤orts
constant; that is, the elasticity of augmentation is positive.
Let us now turn our attention to the case of translation invariant CSFs:
Proposition 2 If a CSF satises axioms A1-A4, A6 and A8, then it is
of the form (3) and the impact functions hk(xk) satisfy
hk(xk) = k + k
nkX
i=1
xik, (10)
where k and k > 0 are parameters, and k =

nk
for all k: If A6 is replaced
by A7, then k = :
Proof. By A8, it is possible to dene the impact function as a function
of
Pnk
i=1 xik so hk(xk) = k(
Pnk
i=1 xik): By Theorem 3 and A6, this function
k() must satisfy
k(nk +
nkX
i=1
xik) = k(
nkX
i=1
xik) + :
Now dene Hk(t) = expfk(t)g. Then
Hk(nk +
nkX
i=1
xik) = expfgHk(
nkX
i=1
xik):
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Let xk = 0: In that case, Hk(nk) = expfgHk(0): Substituting nk by
t shows that it must be that
Hk(t) = ak expf 
nk
tg;
where ak = Hk(0) = expfk(0)g:
Tracing back our steps,
k(
nkX
i=1
xik) = lnHk(
nkX
i=1
xik) = ln ak +

nk
nkX
i=1
xik = k +

nk
nkX
i=1
xik
If we employ A7 instead, then the function k() must satisfy
k(nk +
nkX
i=1
xik) = k(
nkX
i=1
xik) + nk:
Now dene again Hk(t) = expfk(t)g so
Hk(nk +
nkX
i=1
xik) = expfnkgHk(
nkX
i=1
xik):
Applying the same procedure, when xk = 0 it must be the case that
Hk(nk) = expfnkgHk(0); so substituting again
Hk(t) = ak expftg
and
k(
nkX
i=1
xik) = lnHk(
nkX
i=1
xik) = ln ak + 
nkX
i=1
xik = k + 
nkX
i=1
xik:
Summation plus Translation Invariance imply that impact functions must
be linear. This has an additional consequence. Given that the form (3) is
already separable in groups impacts, any equilibrium of a contest with a
translation invariant di¤erence-form function must be in dominant strategies
under two sets of circumstances: 1) when contenders are risk neutral, so the
interpretation of pk(x) as a share or as a winning probability are equivalent; or
2) when individual utilities are non-linear and pk(x) is a winning probability.
In these two cases, the marginal benet of individual e¤ort does not depend
on the e¤ort of any fellow group member or the e¤ort of outsiders. It is
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thus natural that Beviá and Corchón (2014b) microfound this type of CSFs
by means of dominant strategy implementation. Dominance solvability does
not apply however when utilities are non-linear and pk(x) is instead a share
of the prize contested, as in Levine and Smith (1995).10
One potentially undesirable consequence of the Summation axiom is that
the resulting CSFs can admit biases. Take for instance the linear impact
in (10) for the case of two-group contests, i.e. K = 2: In that case the
di¤erence-form (3) boils down to
pk(x) =min

max

1
2
+ k   l + (
_
xk  
_
xl); 0

; 1

;
where
_
xk denotes the average e¤ort in group k: Note that group k has a head-
start (handicap) whenever k > (<)l. The reason why the CSF admits this
type of biases is because the Summation axiom remains silent on the relative
success of di¤erent groups with the same total e¤ort. One possibility is to
modify the axiom in order to account for this problem.
Axiom 9 (Total E¤ort) For any two groups k; l 2 K such thatPnki=1 xik =Pnl
i=1 xil it must be that
pk(xk;x k) =pl(xl;x l):
This axiom is a stronger version of Summation; it is actually a combi-
nation of Summation and the Between-Group Anonymity axiom in Münster
(2009). It requires that two groups with the same total e¤ort must have the
same winning probability regardless of their size. Again, this property can
make sense when e¤orts are monetary units, but not when e¤orts represent
time or when group size matters. For instance, the impact of a group of 10
people demonstrating for 100 hours may not be the same as the impact of a
group of 1000 people demonstrating for an hour.
The following Proposition shows that when Total E¤ort replaces Summa-
tion, the bias described above vanishes.
Proposition 3 If A8 is replaced by A9, then the impact functions charac-
terized in Propositions 1 and 2 must satisfy k =  for all k 2 K:
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that when A9 holds, impact functions, whatever
their functional form, should be identical across groups. To see this note that
hk(xk) = hk(
Pnk
i=1 xik
nk
; :::;
Pnk
i=1 xik
nk
);
10We thank Alberto Vesperoni for pointing this out.
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because A9 also applies to changes in the distribution of e¤orts within groups
which maintain total e¤ort constant. Hence, for any vector xk it is possible
to write the impact of the group as a function of the total e¤ort, i.e. hk(xk) =
k(
Pnk
i=1 xik): Similarly for group l; that is, hl(xk) = l(
Pnl
i=1 xil): From this
it is clear to see that k and l are identical functions since by A9 they yield
the same value whenever they are applied to the same argument. Hence,
impact functions (9) and (10) must not di¤er across groups and k =  for
all k 2 K:
Total E¤ort eliminates biases in favor of certain groups. Such biases can
be desirable in some instances. For instance, when they are the result of a¢ r-
mative action policies aimed at fostering the participation of disadvantaged
groups (Franke, 2012). In other contests, such as when a social planner seeks
to commit to a fair and impartial sharing rule (Corchon and Dahm, 2011),
these biases should be removed.
A particularly interesting CSF emerges when the Total E¤ort axiom and
Scale Invariance are imposed: Denote by Xk the sum of e¤orts in group k
and order groups by their total e¤ort in a decreasing manner. Then, the CSF
characterized by Proposition 3 must be
pk(x) =

1
K +  ln
Xk
GX
for k  K
0 otherwise
where GX = (
Y
K
l=1Xl)
1
K is the geometric mean of groupstotal e¤orts and
K is the largest integer such that XK
GX
> expf 1
Kg:
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have o¤ered the rst systematic study of group contests
where winning probabilities depend on the di¤erence between contestants
e¤ective e¤orts. Our axiomatic characterization rested on an Equalizing
Consistency axiom which imposes that the di¤erence between winning prob-
abilities in the grand contest and in the smaller contest must be identical
across participants in the smaller contest. This contrasts with the consis-
tency axiom employed in all the existing characterizations of the ratio-form
CSF which posits that probabilities in any subcontest should be proportional
to winning probabilities in the grand contest. One advantage of the Equal-
izing Consistency axiom is that it does not bound contestants to have a
zero probability of winning a smaller contest when they have zero chances of
winning a larger one.
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The CSF resulting from our characterization generalizes the functional
form introduced by Che and Gale (2000) and later employed by Rohner
(2006), Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) and Gartzke and Rohner (2011).
This functional form has three distinctive features: 1) Impacts across con-
testants are separable, 2) it awards a sure victory to a contender who over-
powers its rivals by a large enough margin and 3) it allows contenders to
enjoy a positive winning probability when their impact is zero provided that
other contenders are not too strong.
We showed that, contrary to what it has been argued in the literature,
di¤erence-form CSFs can be homogeneous of degree zero, and that they do
not force di¤erences in winning probabilities to remain invariant when ab-
solute di¤erences in raw e¤orts remain constant, i.e. a zero elasticity of
augmentation. In addition, we agged-up that the Translation Invariance
property builds in an implicit bias against big groups which should be cor-
rected. In this process, we also argued that the logistic function (Hirshleifer,
1989, 1991), although often referred to as a di¤erence-form CSF, does not
actually belong to this family. In our opinion, this label should be reserved
only to CSFs satisfying the Equalizing Consistency axiom, which the logistic
form does not satisfy.
In the last part of the paper, we explored one possible technology of
aggregation of e¤orts within groups. This helped us to sharpen our charac-
terization of admissible impact functions. We also showed that a modied
version of the Summation axiom in Münster (2009) can unbias the CSF, a
desirable property in contexts where impartiality has a value.
The family of di¤erence-form CSFs has not been employed in the contest
literature as often as other functional forms. We hope that, by clarifying
its properties, our axiomatization can persuade researchers in the area to
include this family of CSFs in their toolkit. Of course, our characterization
is normative and leaves out strategic interactions. Che and Gale (2000)
showed that their linear di¤erence-form CSF often leads to mixed-strategy
equilibria and that any equilibrium in pure-strategies involves at most one
contender exerting positive e¤ort. One possible next step would be to explore
whether the equilibria of contests under the generalized di¤erence-form CSF
axiomatized here still presents such features. In addition, this form implies
the separability of contender groups, leading to dominant strategy equilibria
when impacts are linear. We explore these issues in a companion paper
(Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2014).
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